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Abstract 
Legal cases are generally won or lost on the basis of statistical discrimination measures, but it 
is workers’ perceptions of discriminatory behavior that are important for understanding many 
labor-supply decisions. Workers who believe that they have been discriminated against are 
more likely to subsequently leave their employers and it is almost certainly workers’ 
perceptions of discrimination that drive formal complaints to the EEOC. Yet the relationship 
between statistical and self-assessed measures of discrimination is far from obvious. We 
expand on the previous literature by using data from the After the JD (AJD) study to compare 
standard Blinder-Oaxaca measures of earnings discrimination to self-reported measures of (i) 
client discrimination; (ii) other work-related discrimination; and (iii) harassment. Overall, our 
results indicate that conventional measures of earnings discrimination are not closely linked to 
the racial and gender bias that new lawyers believe they have experienced on the job. 
Statistical earnings discrimination is only occasionally related to increases in self-assessed 
bias and when it is the effects are very small. Moreover, statistical earnings discrimination 
does not explain the disparity in self-assessed bias across gender and racial groups. 
 
JEL classification: J71, J15, J16, J44 
Keywords: Labour market discrimination, lawyers, gender and racial bias, wages 1.   Introduction 
It is hard to deny that in the nearly fifty years since the adoption of the 1963 Equal Pay Act 
considerable progress has been made in achieving gender and racial equity in the U.S. labor 
market.  Women, for example, now earn approximately 80 cents for every dollar that their male 
colleagues earn -- up from 60 cents on the dollar in the 1960s (see Blau et al. 2010).  Much of the 
progress in closing the gender pay gap stems from the dramatic gains women have made in 
acquiring productive labor market skills.  Young women today, for example, are more likely than 
young men to enroll in and complete postsecondary degrees leaving women the recipients of 
more than half of all bachelors and masters degrees (see Freeman 2004; Blau et al. 2010 for 
reviews), while women's growing labor market attachment has lead to a narrowing of the gender 
gap in occupational attainment and labor market experience.
1  Progress in closing the gender pay 
gap has been particularly rapid among black workers for whom the female-to-male ratio of 
median earnings increased from 55 percent in 1955 to 86 percent in 2007 (Blau et al. 2010).    
  Despite these trends, there are many reasons to believe that many workers continue to 
confront discrimination in the labor market.  First, closing the racial pay gap has proven to be 
much more challenging than closing the gender pay gap, particularly for men.  The ratio of 
Hispanic-to-white median earnings among men has actually fallen from 72 percent (1975) to 60 
percent (2007) (Blau et al. 2010), for example, and the progress that blacks have made in closing 
the racial earnings gap is overstated by the selectivity bias resulting from their high non-
participation rates (see Brown 1984; Chandra 2000; Neal 2004).  Second, labor market bias 
appears to be about much more than just race or gender.  Homosexual men generally experience 
a wage penalty relative to their heterosexual counterparts, for example, though lesbians enjoy a 
                                                           
1 For example, today the  gap in men's and women's labor force participation rates stands at just 10 percentage points 
– a decline from 35 percentage points in 1972 (USDOL 2010a: Table 2). 
  1wage advantage relative to their heterosexual counterparts (e.g. Klawitter and Flatt 1998; Clain 
and Leppel 2001; Berg and Lien 2002; Black et al. 2003; Blandford 2003; Antecol et al. 2008).  
Third, statistical, residual-based decomposition approaches indicate that individuals' productive 
skills do not completely explain existing disparities in pay (see Blau and Kahn 2006; Neal and 
Johnson 1996).  It is difficult to know how much of the “unexplained” portion of the pay gap is 
in fact the result of labor market discrimination, however audit studies, correspondence testing, 
and natural experiments have all been used to document that some employers do discriminate on 
the basis of race, sex, ethnicity, or sexual orientation (Kenney and Wissoker 1994; Riach and 
Rich 1991, 2002; Neumark et al. 1996; Goldin and Rouse 2000; Weichselbaumer 2001; Bertrand 
and Mullainathan 2003; Booth et al. 2009).  Finally, and perhaps most importantly, many 
employees continue to believe that they are not being treated equitably by their employers.  In 
2009, for example, more than 61,000 new charges of employment discrimination on the basis of 
sex or race were filed with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).  This 
represents nearly a 17 percent increase over the number of cases filed a decade earlier.
2     
Given these trends, it is not surprising that there is intense interest in quantifying the 
extent of discrimination in the U.S. labor market.  Economists have a long history of using 
statistical, regression-based methods to decompose the disparity in mean wages (Blinder 1973; 
Oxacca 1973) or in wage distributions (DiNardo et al. 1996; Machado and Mata 2005) to 
understand what can be attributed to differences in workers' productivity-related characteristics 
and what cannot.  However, it is also recognized that labor market discrimination is “unlikely to 
be completely captured by so crude a measure as a log-earnings regression” (Kuhn 1990, pp. 
297).  Legal cases are generally won or lost on the basis of statistical discrimination measures, 
                                                           
2The EEOC is the federal agency responsible for enforcing federal laws that prohibit employment discrimination.  
See www.eeoc.gov for information on charge statistics. 
  2but it is workers' perceptions of discriminatory behavior that are important for understanding 
many labor-supply decisions.  Workers who believe that they have been discriminated against 
are more likely to subsequently leave their employers, for example (Neumark and McLennan 
1995; Johnson and Neumark 1997; Goldsmith et al. 2004), and it is almost certainly workers’ 
perceptions of discrimination that drive formal complaints to the EEOC.  
  Interestingly, the relationship between statistical and self-assessed measures of 
discrimination is far from obvious.
3  Employees do not have perfect information about the wage 
distribution they are facing and employers may exploit this information asymmetry by being 
more likely to discriminate when employees have less accurate information and the probability 
of reporting (and hence detection) is low (Barbezat and Hughes 1990).  Empirically, some 
researchers have found that those women reporting the most sex discrimination, in fact, face the 
least statistical discrimination (Kuhn 1987, 1990; Barbezat and Hughes, 1990; Antecol and 
Kuhn, 2000), while others have found that that these measures are positively related (Hampton 
and Heywood 1993).  The ambiguity of these results is not particularly surprising when one 
considers that many of those who perceive discrimination feel that it occurs along dimensions 
other than pay (Hallock et al. 1998) and that the phrasing of survey questions about 
discrimination is likely to matter (Hampton and Heywood, 1993).  Finally, self-assessed 
discrimination measures allow broader concepts of gender and racial equity to be considered. In 
particular, self-assessed sex discrimination is only loosely related to other forms of gender bias 
that we might care about like sexual harassment (Antecol et al. 2009).
4   
                                                           
3 Statistical measures of labor market discrimination are generally derived as the residual difference in aggregate 
group outcomes which remain once observable productivity-related characteristics have been taken into account.  It 
is well known, however, that omitted variables, unobserved heterogeneity, measurement error, feedback effects and 
pre-labor market discrimination can all confound residual-based estimates of labor market discrimination.  
4It is important to note that while 28,028 sex discrimination charges were filed with the EEOC in 2009 only 942 
cases were filed under the Equal Pay Act. This illustrates that the majority of sex discrimination are not simply 
based on pay but likely involve issues such as hiring decisions, promotion decisions, etc.     
  3  This paper contributes to our understanding of discrimination by investigating the 
relationship between statistical measures and perceptions of discrimination within the legal 
profession.  Lawyers provide a particularly interesting case for studying discrimination because 
courts routinely rely on circumstantial, statistical evidence in deciding whether an employment 
practice or process is discriminatory or not.
5  Consequently, lawyers have a detailed 
understanding of what constitutes employment discrimination for legal purposes and, 
presumably, how to avoid it – or at least avoid evidence of it.  Laband and Lentz (1993) argue 
that this implies that any gender bias within the legal profession may disproportionately take 
more intangible forms making it important to investigate self-assessed discrimination measures.  
  We expand on the previous literature by using information from the After the JD (AJD) 
study to compare standard Blinder-Oaxaca measures of earnings discrimination to self-reported 
measures of (i) client discrimination; (ii) other work-related discrimination; and (iii) harassment.  
The AJD data are unusually rich and contain several important indicators of ability including 
GPA, law-school rank, as well as indicators for clerkship experience, law review, and passing 
the bar on the first time. Moreover, while much of the previous literature is based on the 
experiences of graduates from elite law schools who may have particularly successful career 
trajectories, the AJD data allow us to analyze the employment experiences of a nationally-
representative sample of new lawyers for whom disparities may be more pronounced (Dinovitzer 
et al. 2009).  Finally, unlike previous researchers, we adopt a broad perspective on 
discrimination within the legal profession by assessing the inequities associated with race and 
sexual orientation as well as gender.   
                                                           
5 In particular, civil cases are decided using a “balance of probabilities” or “more likely than not” standard, rather 
than on the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard used in criminal cases.   Strong statistical associations which are 
suggestive of causality in the social sciences can be used in courts to force employers to prove that their employment 
practices are not discriminatory (see Gastwirth 1997).  
  4  We find evidence of a statistically significant wage gap between women and white 
heterosexual men even when we include a rich set of controls. In our most comprehensive 
specification the annual income gap between white heterosexual women and white heterosexual 
men is over $4,900 a year  while for minority women (including lesbians) the gap is over $9000. 
We also find systematic differences between groups in reported discrimination with white 
heterosexual men reporting less harassment or discrimination either by clients or otherwise. 
These differences are not, however, generally explained by the estimated wage gaps. Only white 
heterosexual male lawyers who earn less than their colleagues with the same observable 
characteristics are significantly more likely to report that they have experienced demeaning 
comments and/or harassment or that clients have requested someone else to handle a matter; 
although the magnitude of the effect is very small. White heterosexual women, minority women 
(including lesbians), and minority men (including gay men) who -- based on their observed, 
earnings-related characteristics -- face earnings disparities relative to their white heterosexual 
male colleagues, are generally no more likely to report bias on the basis of their race, religion, 
ethnicity, gender, disability, or sexual orientation. 
  This paper proceeds as follows.  In Section 2, we briefly review the institutional features 
of the legal profession which are particularly relevant for understanding disparities in lawyers' 
earnings.  Section 3 describes the After the JD data set, our estimation sample, and the main 
variables of interest.  Our conceptual framework and estimation strategy are set out in Section 4, 
while our estimation results follow in Section 5.  Section 6 presents our conclusions and 
suggestions for future research.  
 
  52.   The Labor Market for Lawyers 
Historically in the United States, law firms are organized as partnerships.  The structure was 
relatively simple.
6 Partners were the lawyers with an equity stake in their firm and who were 
entitled to a share of the firm’s profit and losses.  The firm’s junior lawyers were associates who 
achieved partnership through an "up-or-out" promotion tournament. Associates entered the firm 
with a cohort of other lawyers who graduated from law school during the same year.  The whole 
cohort advanced at the same pace, were paid the same salary, and were put up for partner at the 
same time. Stopping the clock was rare and there were few if any ways to remain at a firm if a 
lawyer was not either a partner or on a partnership track.  Given the “lock-step” nature of the 
partnership track much of the debate about discrimination focused on the pipeline of women who 
were rising through the ranks of law firms rather than on differences in compensation between 
male and female associates. Differences in salaries between male and female lawyers was largely 
driven by the type of law practiced, differences in the associates salaries at firms men and 
women worked at, and the paucity of female partners (Scharf and Flom 2010). 
  This structure has changed significantly in the last decade in ways that may 
systematically disadvantage women. Increasingly law firms have grafted alternative tracks onto 
the old associate partner model. These include contract attorneys, staff attorneys, and non-equity 
partners. Each of these positions has a slightly different structure. Contract attorneys, for 
example, are not employees of the firm and are hired on a short term basis for specific projects.
7  
Staff attorneys, by contrast, are employees of the firm but are not on tenure track and hence 
receive less compensation and do not enjoy the same salary increases as associates. Perhaps 
because these positions can be part-time, unlike associates positions, they are disproportionately 
                                                           
6 For a more detailed discussion of the historic and current structure of law firms see Scharf and Flom (2010). 
7 Scharf and Flom (2010) refer to contract attorneys as law’s version of outsourcing. 
  6filled by women (Scharf and Flom 2010). The National Association of Women Lawyers 
(NAWL) finds that in 2009 over 60 percent of staff attorneys were women while women 
occupied only 46 percent of the partner track associate positions. 
  Even at the higher levels of the law firm the new tracks have created the possibility of 
salary divergence.  The emergence of very large firms and an emphasis on profitability has 
intensified the focus on "rainmaking", i.e., generating new clients for the firm, and high billable 
hours, making the road to partnership more difficult (Galanter and Palay 1991).  In addition, 
many law firms are beginning to abandon compensation systems which reward all partners 
equally in favor of a points-based, "eat-what-you-kill", compensation systems in which partners 
are remunerated on the basis of fees billed and clients generated (see Epstein et al. 1999). The 
most obvious manifestation of these changes is the creation of the so called non-equity partners. 
Non-equity partners do not have to purchase shares in the firm but are paid only a fixed salary 
and perhaps a bonus based on performance.  Because they are presented to clients as “partners” 
firms typically will not disclose who is an equity partner versus a non-equity partner. However 
the NAWL survey finds that 27 percent of the non-equity partners in their survey are women 
while only 16 percent of the equity partners are women.
8 The divergence of pay between these 
tracks suggests that there are now greater opportunities for disparity in salary based on race and 
gender.     
Not all lawyers choose to enter private law firms of course.  Many pursue alternative 
career paths working in government agencies, in business firms, or in solo practices where 
employer expectations and compensation rules are fundamentally different.  Discretionary forms 
of compensation, e.g., bonuses, which can be an important source of earnings disparity in large 
private firms (see Dinovitzer et al. 2009), may be irrelevant in other employment settings.  It is 
                                                           
8 We are unaware of a similar survey concerning minorities. 
  7not surprising then that lawyers' earnings are closely linked to the sector (i.e., public versus 
private), size of firm, practice area, and region in which they are employed.
9  Earnings are higher 
in larger firms and in big cities, for example.  Moreover, the career paths of young associates are 
heavily reliant on whether or not they have the opportunity to connect with more senior lawyers 
and their clients and to work in more lucrative practice areas (Dinovitzer et al. 2009).  Finally, 
family leaves or working part-time can reduce women's earnings and partnership chances 
(Donovan 1990; Epstein et al. 1995).         
  The legal profession is less racially and ethnically diverse than most other professions.  
Currently, 89 percent of lawyers and 90 percent of judges in the United States are white -- in 
comparison to 70 percent of the working-age U.S. population as a whole -- and less than one 
percent of lawyers are openly homosexual (ABA 2010).  The American Bar Association (2010) 
has raised concerns about this issue and is promoting a number of strategies designed to increase 
the racial diversity of the legal profession.   In contrast, women have entered the legal profession 
in record numbers.  In 1975, only seven percent of lawyers were women, while in 2009 that 
proportion had risen to 32 percent (USDOL 2010b: Table 11; Wootton 1997).  
  This surge of women entering the legal profession has led to a large literature examining 
gender differences in lawyers' earnings.  Much of this literature is based on cross-sectional 
analyses and concludes that women earn approximately 40 to 50 percent less than their male 
colleagues.  Accounting for a range of individual characteristics including law school quality, 
academic achievement, job history, hours of work, and firm characteristics reduces, but does not 
eliminate, these gender differences in earnings (see Noonan et al. 2005 for a review).  Noonan et 
al. (2005) take advantage of longitudinal data for two cohorts of graduates from the University of 
Michigan Law School and find that although the gender gap in lawyers’ earnings is small 
                                                           
9 See Dinovitzer et al. (2009), Noonan et al. 2005, and Wood et al. (1993) for particularly helpful reviews.  
  8immediately after passing the bar, 15 years later the gap is almost identical to that among white, 
full-time, full-year workers more generally (see also Wood et al. 1993).  These sex-based 
earnings disparities cannot be explained by individuals' law school performance, work history, 
child bearing, or job characteristics and have not narrowed across succeeding cohorts of 
graduates.  These are remarkable results given the degree of homogeneity in the educational 
background and training of University of Michigan lawyers.    
  Much less is known about the link between lawyers' race or sexual orientation and their 
earnings or about the process generating the earnings of lawyers from non-elite schools.   
Moreover, previous researchers have generally focused exclusively on statistical, residual-based 
measures of earning discrimination without considering men's and women's perceptions of the 
treatment they experience and the outcomes they achieve.
10  This is unfortunate given the 
complexities of legal firms' compensation systems which effectively tie lawyers' earnings to the 
hours they work, the mentoring they receive, the cases they are assigned, and the clients they 
have access to.  This makes it critical to begin to assess the relationship between statistical 
measures of earnings differences and perceptions of discrimination within the legal profession.  
 
3.  The Data:  After the JD (AJD): A Longitudinal Study of Careers in Transition 
We use data from the first wave of the After the JD (AJD): A Longitudinal Study of Careers in 
Transition which follows 10 percent of the individuals who passed the bar for the first time in 
2000.  These data are ideal for our purposes as they contain detailed information on individuals' 
demographic characteristics, educational backgrounds, firm characteristics, work histories, and 
earnings as well as their self-assessed experiences of work-related discrimination, client 
                                                           
10 The exception is Laband and Lentz (1998) who analyse the effect of self-reported sexual harassment on job 
satisfaction, earnings, and job turnover. 
  9discrimination, and harassment.  Information about the quality (i.e. rank) of the law school 
individuals attended, their law school performance (law school review, participation in moot 
court, and pro bono work) and the number of job offers they received allow us to directly 
account for differences in individuals' ability.  Finally, geographic location is an important 
determinant of lawyers' earnings (see Dinovitzer et al. 2009 for a review) and we use the 
geographic indicators in the AJD data to account for any regional wage differences in lawyers' 
earnings.  These detailed controls are critical to constructing valid statistical measures of 
discrimination.    
 
3.1 The Estimation Sample 
 
We restrict the sample to eligible respondents who were employed full-time (i.e., those working 
more than 35 hours per week), were practicing law at the time of the survey and were less than 
45 years of age.  We further restrict the sample to individuals who passed the bar after the date of 
their law degree as well as to those who were not in their current job more than two years prior to 
graduating law school.  Finally, we restrict the sample to respondents who have complete 
information on all of the key variables of interest for our analysis leaving a final sample size of 
2,694 respondents. 
  We create indicator variables to categorize new lawyers into one of the four following 
groups: (i) minority men (including homosexual men); (ii) minority women (including 
homosexual women); (iii) white (heterosexual) women; and (iv) white (heterosexual) men.   
Henceforth we refer to these groups as minority men, minority women, white women, and white 
men, respectively.  Our sample includes 412 minority men, 449 minority women, 760 white 
women, and 1073 white men. 
    
  103.2  Annual Salaries and Reported Discrimination 
Table 1 reports the annual mean salaries for our four groups of new lawyers.  The white male 
lawyers in our sample earn $88,751 on average each year, while male lawyers who are members 
of minority groups earn $94,653 -- 6.2 percent more.  Despite the similarity in their educational 
backgrounds, female lawyers earn substantially less than their male counterparts.  Specifically, 
white women earn $82,165 which is 8.0 percent less than white men, while minority women earn 
on average $82,409, i.e., 7.7 percent less.  The magnitude of this gender earnings gap among 
white lawyers is consistent with the earnings gap often found for lawyers in their first year of 
employment (Wood et al. 1993; Biddle and Hamermesh 1998), while the gender earnings gap 
among lawyers in minority groups is somewhat larger. 
Table 1 Here 
  The men and women in our sample were asked whether or not they have experienced any 
of the following in their place of work as a result of their race, religion, ethnicity, gender, 
disability, or sexual orientation: (i) demeaning comments/harassment; (ii) client requests for 
someone else to handle a matter; or (iii) other form of discrimination.
11  Using this information, 
we created three indicator variables which equal one for those respondents who report 
experiencing these forms of discrimination or harassment and zero otherwise.   
  Our results indicate that men who are members of minority groups are nearly four times 
as likely as white men to report that they have experienced demeaning comments or harassment 
at work (see Table 1).  In particular, 11.1 percent of minority men report having been the victim 
of harassment, while 12.7 percent report having experienced other forms of discrimination.  The 
incidence of perceived harassment and discrimination is even higher among female lawyers.   
                                                           
11 For simplicity we will refer to these outcomes as harassment, client discrimination, and other discrimination 
respectively. “Other Discrimination” includes both missed assignment and other forms of discrimination.   
  11More than one in five white women (21.9 percent) and one in four minority women (25.3 
percent) report experiencing harassing behavior at work, while female lawyers also report 
significantly more client and other discrimination than do their male colleagues.  Interestingly, 
the disparity between white and minority women's perceptions of discrimination and harassment 
are not statistically significant, suggesting that at least with respect to these behaviors the issue is 
one of gender not of minority status.   
  We investigate the relationship between our indicators of harassment and discrimination 
in more depth in Table 2 by testing for significant differences across a series of conditional 
means.  For example, columns 1 and 2 report the incidence of client and other discrimination 
among those who do and do not experience harassment.  If harassment and discrimination are 
independent events, we would expect these conditional means to be the same.  We find, 
however, that with few exceptions the incidence of both client and other discrimination is 
significantly higher among those individuals who report experiencing harassment than among 
those who do not.  For example, among those white female lawyers who do not experience 
harassment only one in ten report experiencing client or other discrimination.  Among those who 
do report harassment, these rates soar to 24.9 (client discrimination) and 49.6 percent (other 
discrimination).  Similarly, the incidence of client discrimination is significantly higher among 
those reporting other forms of discrimination than for those who do not, e.g., 30.0 versus 9.8 
percent for white women (see columns 5 and 6).  Thus, it appears that harassing and 
discriminatory behavior may be closely intertwined within the legal profession.  Alternatively, it 
  12may be that our measures of harassment and discrimination are simply too blunt to completely 
capture the specific nuances of gender and racial bias.
12    
Table 2 Here 
 
3.3 Observable Characteristics  
We control for the following demographic characteristics in the model: age, marital status, and 
presence of children.
13  New lawyers are roughly 31 years of age irrespective of their group (see 
Table 3).  In addition, white men are more likely to be married than are individuals in all other 
groups (65 percent) followed by white women (54 percent), minority men (51 percent), and 
minority women (42 percent). Finally, white (minority) men are 1.9 (1.6) times more likely to 
have children present than are white (minority) women. 
Table 3 Here 
  Our estimation model also includes a number of controls to account for respondents’ 
educational backgrounds.  Specifically, we include indicators for directly entering law school, 
passing the bar exam on the first attempt, law school rank, participating in law review, pro bono 
work, and moot court while in law school, and leadership activities while in law school, as well 
as the number of additional job offers received and tenure on the current job.   
Table 3 reveals that irrespective of their minority status or gender, roughly 60 percent of 
new lawyers do not go to law school directly.  Minority men and women are less likely to go to 
law school directly (38 and 39 percent, respectively) than are white men (41 percent) and women 
(44 percent).  Table 3 also shows that white men (women) are 9 (7) percentage points more 
likely to pass the bar on the first try relative to their minority counterparts.  Interestingly, we find 
                                                           
12 Antecol et al. (2009) find that when asked directly, men and women do appear to discriminate between incidents 
of sex discrimination and incidents of sexual harassment making the wording of survey questions regarding 
discrimination and harassment very important 
13 See Appendix Table 1 for variable definitions. 
  13that minorities are more likely to go to higher ranked schools relative to their white counterparts. 
Furthermore, all groups had roughly 3 additional job offers and 1.3 years of tenure on their 
current job.  Women were also found to be more likely to participate in law review (3 to 4 
percentage points depending on minority status) and do pro bono work (roughly 7 percentage 
points irrespective of minority status) while their male counterparts were more likely to 
participate in moot court (2 to 4 percentage points depending on minority status).  Participation 
in pro bono work was also substantially higher among minorities than their white counterparts 
(roughly 7 to 8 percentage points depending on gender).  Finally, women (minorities) were more 
likely to report taking a leadership role than their male (white) counterparts; roughly 4 (10) to 10 
(15) percentage points depending on minority status (gender). 
  We also account for firm characteristics (indicators for firm type and firm size) in our 
analysis.  According to Table 3, white men are more likely to be in private practice (80 percent) 
relative to minority men (72 percent), white women (76 percent) and minority women (66 
percent).  Minority women are more likely to work in government (24.6 percent), followed by 
white women (19.4 percent), minority men (18.6 percent), and white men (12.6 percent).  White 
women are the least likely to be in solo practice (1 percent) compared to the other three groups 
(roughly 5 percent).  In addition, minority men (women) tend to work in firms with roughly 17 
(7) more employees than their white counterparts. 
  Finally we include a measure of average earnings for lawyers in the region in our 
analysis.  Interestingly, white men are more likely to be working in regions with lower average 
wages ($79,810) while minority women are more likely to be working in regions with the highest 
average wages ($89,586), with minority men ($86,793) and white women ($82,124) falling in 
the middle. 
  144.  Conceptual Framework and Estimation Strategy  
Our goal is to understand the relationship between standard statistical measures of job-related 
discrimination within the legal profession and lawyers’ own perceptions of discrimination.   
Specifically, do statistical measures of discrimination accurately predict whether or not lawyers 
believe that they themselves have experienced employer or client discrimination or have been the 
victim of sexual harassment?   
 
4.1 Statistical versus Perceived Discrimination  
As the first step toward answering this question, we specify a series of group-specific earnings 
models as follows: 








i X y ε μ β + + =
where  i indexes individuals and g indexes our four target groups: minority men, minority 
women, white women, and white men.  Moreover,   is a vector of productivity-related 
characteristics including demographic characteristics, educational background, firm 
characteristics, and a measure of average earnings for lawyers in the region.
i X
14  Finally, 
captures unobserved, individual-specific factors driving earnings, 
g
i μ β  is a vector of 
coefficients to be estimated, and ε  is an error term with the usual properties.   
  We then define two alternative statistical measures of earnings disparity.  The first 
measure,  , captures the deviation between what an individual would be expected to earn if he 
or she were paid on the same basis as white men and what he or she actually earns.  The second 
1
i D
                                                           
14 Specifically, personal characteristics include age, marital status, and the presence of children; educational 
background includes indicators for directly entering law school, passing the bar exam on the first attempt, law 
school rank, participating in law review, pro bono work, and moot court while in law school, and leadership 
activities as well as the number of job offers received and tenure; and firm characteristics include indicators for firm 
type (private, solo practice, government, other) and firm size.     
  15measure,  , reflects the difference between what one would earn if compensated in the same 
way as white men rather than as other members of one's racial/gender group are compensated.  
Specifically,    
2
i D
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These two statistical discrimination measures are clearly related.  However,   includes any 
effect of unobserved, productivity-related individual effects (for example ability) in estimates of 
the extent of earnings disparity, while  ignores the earnings effects of individuals' unobserved 
characteristics (i.e., ), focusing only on the difference in the returns ( ) to individuals' 







^ ^ g m β β −
i X
  Following Kuhn (1987), we assume that women and minorities use the information 
embodied in these statistical measures of discrimination -- along with private information about 
their own specific employment conditions, the treatment they have received from their firms and 
clients, etc. -- to develop views about whether they themselves have been the victim of 
discrimination or sexual harassment.  Specifically, let the extent to which individual i believes 
that he or she has been discriminated against be given by:  
i i
j
i i D PD η ω γ + + =
*          ( 4 )  
 
where j = 1, 2 and  i ω  is non-statistical (Kuhn 1987) or intangible discrimination (Laband and 
Lentz 1993) which is observed by the individual, but not the econometrician and  i η  is a random 
error term.   
 
  164.2  Estimation Equation:  The Probability of Reporting Discrimination 
Individuals are assumed to report that they have experienced discrimination whenever their latent 
perceived level of discrimination exceeds some threshold value,  . These thresholds can be 
thought of as reflecting individuals' sensitivity to (or willingness to report) behavior that is 
potentially racially or gender biased.
) ( i k z
15  Specifically, the probability that an individual reports 
discrimination is given by: 
)) ( Pr( ) 1 Pr( i i
j
i i k z D PD > + = = ω γ          (5) 
where  ) ( i i X ω ω = ,  i i i i zX k z η ϕ ) ( ) ( + = , and  and  ) , 0 ( ~
2
ϕ σ ϕ N i 0 ) , ( i X COV = i ϕ . Thus, we 
allow for the possibility that individuals' observed characteristics affect both the extent of non-
statistical (intangible) discrimination they experience as well as their sensitivity to those 
experiences, i.e., the threshold they use when reporting that discrimination has occurred.  Given 
the data available to us, it is not possible to separately identify these two effects.
16
  This framework results in the following reduced-form estimation equation for the 
probability that a lawyer reports being the victim of client discrimination, other work-related 
discrimination, or harassment:      
                                                           
15 Kuhn (1987) conceptualizes   as the degree of certainty a woman has that her experiences represent "true" 
discrimination.  It may also capture variation in individuals' beliefs about the specific events or experiences that are 
in fact discriminatory.  In particular, there is evidence that views about which behaviors constitute sexual 
harassment have changed over time (Antecol and Cobb-Clark 2004), while many workers who experience unwanted 
sexual behavior at work do not necessarily label it as sexual harassment per se (see Antecol and Cobb-Clark 2006; 
Marin and Guadagno 1999; Magley, et al. 1999).   
) ( i k z
16 Antecol and Kuhn (2000) use additional information on the extent to which women feel they are advantaged by 
their gender to separately identify these two effects.  They find that young female jobseekers are more likely to 
report that they have been discriminated against because they are more sensitive to behavior that is not gender-
neutral. 
  17                                                         ( 6 )                            
where  , 
) ( ) Pr( ) 1 Pr( δ ω Z e cX b aD PD i i i
j
i i Φ = > + + = =
) , , ( i i
j
i X D Z ω = ) , , ( c b a = δ  ,  and  Φ  is the standard normal cumulative density 
function.   
 
5.  Results 
5.1 Earnings Disparity among Lawyers: Statistical Measures of Earnings Discrimination  
We begin by considering the magnitude of the earnings gap across groups in order to set the 
context for our statistical analysis of earnings disparity.  Specifically, each column in Table 4 
corresponds to an earnings regression -- increasing in controls -- estimated on the full sample of 
lawyers including group indicators (omitted category is white men).  The results (OLS 
coefficients and standard errors) allow us to assess how the earnings gap between groups 
changes as we account for differences in individuals' productivity-related characteristics.    
Table 4 Here 
  Not surprisingly, we find that the size of the estimated earnings gap depends heavily on 
whether or not we account for group differences in productivity-related characteristics.  A 
comparison of the unconditional differences in group earnings (column 1) and earnings gaps 
conditional on annual hours (column 2), for example, reveals that much of women's earnings 
disadvantage can be attributed to the lower hours that they spend working.  Specifically, the 
earnings gap between minority women and white men is cut by 40 percent (from $6343 to 
$3750) and the gap between white women and white men falls substantially (from $6586 to 
$4231) once we simply account for individuals' annual hours of work.  Moreover, the substantial 
earnings advantage enjoyed by male lawyers from minority groups over their white male 
colleagues disappears and becomes an earnings disadvantage as we progressively control for 
  18individuals' annual hours, personal characteristics, educational background, firm characteristics, 
and regional wages.   Similarly, the earnings penalty faced by white women and minority women 
gets even larger once we begin to account for the factors (other than annual hours) associated 
with their productivity.  Finally, it is interesting to note the important influence of firm 
characteristics and regional wages on the disparity in earnings between groups.  Minority men, 
for example, are estimated to have an earnings advantage of $3500 when we do not account for 
either firm characteristics or regional wages, and an earnings disadvantage of $178 when we do.  
This indicates that on balance male lawyers from minority groups are employed in those firms 
and in those regions of the country where annual earnings are typically higher.  Similar results 
hold for white and minority women. 
   Against this backdrop, we estimate equation (1) separately for each group and use the 
results to calculate the two alternative statistical measures of earnings discrimination given in 
equations (2) and (3) for each individual.
17  The first measure ( ) includes the effect of any 
unobserved individual effects related to earnings in the estimate of earnings disparity, while the 
second ( ) ignores unobserved individual heterogeneity and considers only group differences 
in the returns to individuals' observed characteristics.  Table 5 presents the mean results as well 






Table 5 Here 
  The results indicate that the statistical earnings gap between minority men and their white 
male colleagues is very small and negative, averaging only $423 per year.  Thus, compensating 
                                                           
17Our statistical measures of earnings discrimination will also reflect any effect of unobserved heterogeneity which 
is not accounted for by our controls.   
18 In each case, white men are the reference group.  Therefore,   for all white men.  Moreover, since it is the 
case that  the means of the two measures are the same. 
0
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  19minority men on the same basis as white men would have only a trivial effect on their average 
annual earnings.   In contrast, statistical earnings discrimination is much more substantial among 
female lawyers amounting to approximately $5067 on average for white women and $9373 for 
minority women.  It is also important to note that there is a great deal of individual-level 
variation in our statistical measures of earnings discrimination.  Those individuals in the lowest 
quartile have negative values indicating that their earnings would fall if they were paid on the 
same basis as white men, however, statistical earnings discrimination becomes quite sizeable for 
those in the top quartile of the distribution.  Not surprisingly, the distribution of individual-
specific measures of earnings discrimination is more disperse when we account for unobserved 
heterogeneity than when we do not.       
  Taken together these results indicate that the magnitude of the earnings disparity among 
recent law school graduates depends heavily on the characteristics of the groups being compared.  
In particular, earnings gaps across groups tend to increase -- rather than decrease -- as we 
increasingly control for individuals' productivity-related characteristics.    This results in a great 
deal of variation in the extent to which individuals' would be expected to benefit from being 
compensated on the same basis as white men.  We turn now to consider whether these 
differences in statistical measures of discrimination can help us to understand lawyers' 
propensity to report being subjected to employer discrimination, client discrimination, and 
harassment. 
 
5.2 The Link Between Perceived Bias and Statistical Measures of Earnings Discrimination 
Are those lawyers facing larger wage disparities also more likely to report experiencing 
harassment and discrimination?  We answer this question by using probit regression to estimate 
  20the determinants of reported harassment, client discrimination, and other discrimination (see 
equation 6). We estimate three specifications.  Model 1 includes a measure of earnings disparity 
which accounts for unobserved individual-specific effects (i.e.,  ), while Model 2 includes a 
measure which focuses only difference in the returns to individuals' observed characteristics (i.e., 
).   Model 3 does not account for statistical earnings discrimination at all.  Both Models 1 and 
2 also include group indicators and interactions which allow the effect of statistical earnings 
disparities to differ across groups.  All models include a rich set of other controls.  The results 





Table 6 Here 
  White male lawyers who earn less than their colleagues with the same observable 
characteristics are significantly more likely to report that -- as a result of their race, religion, 
ethnicity, gender, disability, or sexual orientation -- they have experienced demeaning comments 
and/or harassment or that clients have requested someone else to handle a matter (see Model 
1).
19   Thus, for white men, statistical earnings discrimination is related to an increase in 
perceived bias at work.  These effects are small, however, with each $10,000 gap in earnings 
associated with an increase in reported harassment of 0.6 percentage points and an increase in 
reported client discrimination of 0.7 percentage points.  There is no relationship between 
earnings disparities and reports of other job-related forms of discrimination. 
  In general, the relationship between perceived bias and statistical earnings discrimination 
(as measured by  ) is much the same for white women, minority women, and minority men.  





                                                           
19 In Model 1, the marginal effect of statistical earnings discrimination reflects the difference in reported bias among 
white men (the omitted group) facing different degrees of statistical earnings discrimination.  The earnings 
discrimination by group interactions capture the difference (relative to white men) in this relationship for other 
groups. 
  21association between statistical earnings discrimination and perceived harassment is statistically 
smaller (by 0.8 percentage points with each $10,000 gap in earnings) for minority men and 
women than it is for white male lawyers.  In other words, minority men and women are less 
sensitive to measured earnings gaps between themselves and their white male colleagues when 
reporting harassment.  In fact, -- unlike white male lawyers -- minority lawyers facing earnings 
disparities are no more likely to report harassment than are other minority lawyers who do not.
  These results are based on Model 1 which accounts for the effects of unobserved, 
individual-specific effects when calculating the extent of earnings disparity (i.e.  ).   At the 
same time, women and minorities may judge the extent of statistical earnings discrimination they 
face not based on their own personal circumstances, but rather on the basis of the average 
earnings of colleagues in their group (i.e.  ).  We find, however, that there is no association 
between statistical earnings discrimination measured in this way and reports of harassment, 
client discrimination, or other forms of discrimination (see Model 2).  None of the marginal 






20  In short, white women and minorities who -- based on their observed, earnings-
related characteristics -- face earnings disparities relative to their white male colleagues are no 
more likely to report bias on the basis of their race, religion, ethnicity, gender, disability, or 
sexual orientation.              
  Finally, it is important to note that accounting for statistical earnings discrimination does 
little to explain the difference across groups in the propensity of reporting harassment or 
discrimination.  Minority men, for example, are approximately 13 percentage points more likely 
                                                           
20 Since   is not defined for white men, in Model 2 the marginal effect of statistical earnings discrimination 
reflects the difference in reported bias among white women (the omitted group) facing different degrees of statistical 
earnings discrimination.  The interaction terms capture the difference in this relationship for minority men and 
women respectively.  
2
i D
  22than white men to report harassment whether or not we account for statistical earnings 
discrimination.  Similarly, the propensity of white and minority women to report harassment, 
client discrimination, or other work-related discrimination is generally unaffected by the 
inclusion of statistical earnings discrimination measures in our model.   
  Overall, our results indicate that conventional measures of earnings discrimination are not 
closely linked to the racial and gender bias that new lawyers believe they have experienced on 
the job.  Statistical earnings discrimination is only occasionally related increases in self-assessed 
bias and when it is the effects are very small.  Moreover, statistical earnings discrimination does 
not explain the disparity in self-assessed bias across gender and racial groups.  It is interesting to 
note that these results for individuals entering the U.S. legal profession in 2000 are broadly 
consistent with previous results for representative samples of U.S. and Canadian workers 
surveyed in the 1970s.  In particular, Kuhn (1987) finds that the extent of statistical earnings 
discrimination a woman faces is negatively -- not positively -- related to the probability she will 
report discrimination when asked in a confidential survey.  He estimates a structural wage model 
and concludes that this surprising result is due to the fact that women place much greater weight 
on non-statistical evidence when formulating views about whether they have experienced 
discrimination.  Barbezat and Hughes (1990) argue that this result is also consistent with 
employers simply indulging in more discrimination when employees have less information about 
relative outcomes and the probability of being detected is lower.  Similarly, despite facing less 
statistical earnings disparity, young women are much more likely than older women to report 
facing discrimination when applying for a job suggesting that they may be more sensitive to 
gender bias (Antecol and Kuhn 2000).   
 
  236.  Conclusions and Suggestions for Future Research 
Perceptions matter for the legal system.  Because clients must typically initiate legal action either 
by filing a grievance or contacting an enforcement agency or a private attorney, whether or not 
an individual believes that he or she has experienced discrimination matters a great deal.     
However it is still the case -- irrespective of how egregious workers perceive employers’ 
behavior to be -- that damages must be alleged in order for the case to proceed.  Given this, the 
legal system has typically turned to the standard, "objective" measures of discrimination 
typically computed by economists (such as, wage gaps or gaps in unemployment durations) to 
provide evidence of the extent of damage. Yet the relationship between self-assessed and 
statistical measures of discrimination is far from obvious. 
  In this paper we examine recent After the JD (AJD) data on the labor market experiences 
of lawyers which contains information both on perceived discrimination and earnings.  Lawyers 
are particularly useful for examining the link between statistical and self-assessed measures of 
discrimination because they have a better sense than most employees of whether or not the 
discrimination they perceive meets the legal threshold for remedial action.  Moreover the timing 
of the AJD survey corresponds to changes in the market for lawyers that opened up the 
possibility of greater variation in earnings among those practicing similar types of law. 
Consistent with this, we find evidence of a statistically significant earnings gap between women 
(irrespective of minority status) and white heterosexual men even when we include a rich set of 
controls.  In contrast, the statistical earnings gap between minority men and their white male 
colleagues is very small.    
At the same time, white heterosexual women, minority women (including lesbians), and 
minority men (including gay men) all report significantly more harassment and discrimination 
  24than do their white heterosexual male counterparts.  This self-assessed discrimination, however, 
is not highly correlated with our estimated statistical earnings gaps.  Only white heterosexual 
male lawyers who earn less than their colleagues with the same observable characteristics are 
significantly more likely to report that they have experienced demeaning comments and/or 
harassment or that clients have requested someone else to handle a matter; although the 
magnitude of the effect is very small.  White heterosexual women and minorities (irrespective of 
gender) whose observed earnings are significantly lower than their otherwise similar white 
heterosexual male counterparts, are no more likely than those paid the same as white 
heterosexual men to report bias on the basis of their race, religion, ethnicity, gender, disability, or 
sexual orientation. 
These results are important in advancing our understanding of bias within the legal 
profession.  However, they also leave open a number of puzzles yet to be resolved.  In particular, 
while individuals can be compensated in discrimination cases for damages that are not related to 
income, it is rare for discrimination cases to proceed without any evidence that individuals have 
also experienced a reduction in income (Laycock, 2006).  Given the tendency for courts to use 
statistical discrimination measures to gauge the extent to which that income reduction results 
from discrimination, it is surprising that there is not more of a relationship between statistical and 
self-assessed measures of discrimination.  Why is the link between these measures so weak?   
In moving forward, we need to know more about the pervasiveness of intangible (i.e., 
unrelated to income) forms of bias and their consequences for individuals’ legal careers.  If self-
assessed bias is not the result of earnings disparity, then what drives it?  In particular, do the new 
complex organizational structures and compensation schemes within law firms provide 
opportunities for more intangible bias to occur?  Unlike the “lock-step” nature of the old style 
  25partnership track, these new arrangements foster earnings diversity among colleagues doing 
similar work.  To the extent that the source of this diversity is not fully transparent, information 
asymmetries may provide law firms with additional opportunities to discriminate among their 
employees (see Barbezat and Hughes 1990).     
We also need to understand the consequences of self-assessed bias for individuals’ future 
legal careers.  How does believing that one has been subject to discrimination or harassment 
from ones’ employers, colleagues or clients affect lawyers’ satisfaction with their legal careers?  
Will those who believe they have experienced bias leave the legal profession to pursue 
opportunities elsewhere?
21   
Finally, despite the rapid movement of women into the legal profession, we are only now 
beginning to understand how the outcomes of female lawyers differ to those of their male 
colleagues.  Much more work needs to be done to understand the factors underlying bias along 
racial or sexual orientation lines. How do law firms’ complex organizational structures and 
compensation systems affect outcomes for racial minorities, gay men, and lesbians?  Although 
standard statistical measures of discrimination suggest that little earnings discrimination is taking 
place – at least with respect to minority men – self-assessed measures of discrimination and 
harassment suggest that bias remains a large problem for these groups.  This is likely to hinder 
future efforts to fully integrate the legal profession.    
                                                           
21 Antecol, et al.  (2011a and 2011b) are examining some of these issues in companion papers. 
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  30Table 1. Annual Salary, Raw Wage Gap, and Reported Harassment/Discrimination by Group
Annual Raw Earnings Reported Harassment/Discrimination^
Salary Gap Harassment Client Other
($) (Wa-Wb)/Wb Discrimination Work-Related
Discrimination
Group
White/Het/Male (a) 88,751 0.032 0.064 0.074













The number of observations are 1073, 412, 760, and 449 for white/het/male, minority/male, white/het/female, and
minority/female, respectively.  Sampling weights used.
^The number of observations are slightly smaller due to missing values.
a indicates significantly different from white/het/male at 5% level.
b indicates significantly different from minority men at 5% level.
c indicates significantly different from white/het/female at 5% level.Table 2. Relationship between Reported Harassment and Reported Discrimination by Group
(Conditional Means)
Other Work-Related
Harassment Client Discrimination Discrimination
010101
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
White/Het/Male
Harassment 0.026 0.096 0.018 0.211
(n=1000) (n=68) (n=1002) (n=68)
Client Discrimination 0.060 0.206 0.049 0.258
(n=1033) (n=35) (n=1002) (n=67)
Other Work-Related 0.061 0.487 0.057 0.291
Discrimination (n=1034) (n=36) (n=1001) (n=68)
Minority/Male
Harassment 0.109 0.107 0.067 0.411
(n=379) (n=29) (n=349) (n=60)
Client Discrimination 0.062 0.061 0.051 0.142
(n=359) (n=49) (n=349) (n=59)
Other Work-Related 0.083 0.470 0.114 0.284
Discrimination (n=359) (n=50) (n=379) (n=29)
White/Het/Female
Harassment 0.189 0.394 0.136 0.569
(n=653) (n=96) (n=611) (n=140)
Client Discrimination 0.106 0.249 0.098 0.300
(n=588) (n=161) (n=611) (n=140)
Other Work-Related 0.106 0.496 0.155 0.420
Discrimination (n=589) (n=162) (n=655) (n=96)
Minority/Female
Harassment 0.239 0.351 0.101 0.614
(n=391) (n=51) (n=314) (n=130)
Client Discrimination 0.106 0.170 0.102 0.177
(n=323) (n=119) (n=311) (n=130)
Other Work-Related 0.143 0.702 0.264 0.404
Discrimination (n=326) (n=118) (n=390) (n=51)
Bold (shaded) indicates the incidence of reported harassment/discrimination among those who do and do not
report experiencing harassment/discrimination (i.e., column 1 vs. column 2, column 3 vs. column 4, and
column 5 vs. column 6) are significantly different at the 5 (10) percent level.Table 3. Summary Statistics by Group
Total WHM MMIN WHF FMIN
Annual Hours
Annual Hours 2363.916 2393.655 2416.686 2322.996 2314.684
Demographic Characteristics
Age 30.719 30.829 31.386 30.468 30.391
Married 0.573 0.646 0.505 0.544 0.421
Presence of Children 0.246 0.319 0.254 0.171 0.161
Educational Background
Law School Directly 0.416 0.409 0.383 0.444 0.391
Pass Bar 1st Try 0.887 0.910 0.821 0.898 0.824
Law School Ranking
  Top 10 0.093 0.091 0.114 0.077 0.128
  Top 11-20 0.097 0.087 0.112 0.097 0.127
  Top 21-100 0.496 0.482 0.521 0.516 0.472
  Tier 3 & Lower 0.314 0.340 0.253 0.310 0.273
# of Additonal Job Offers 2.894 3.085 2.970 2.648 2.778
Participation in:
  Law Review 0.431 0.418 0.403 0.457 0.429
  Moot Court 0.376 0.393 0.387 0.354 0.363
  Pro Bono Work 0.325 0.276 0.353 0.350 0.424
Leadership in Extra Curricular Activity 0.396 0.326 0.478 0.425 0.521
Tenure 1.341 1.324 1.279 1.358 1.421
Firm Characteristics
Type of Organization
  Private Law Firm 0.762 0.801 0.718 0.756 0.658
  Solo Practice 0.033 0.043 0.049 0.010 0.051
  Government 0.168 0.126 0.186 0.194 0.246
  Other Organization 0.037 0.030 0.048 0.040 0.045
Number of Lawyers at your location/firm 78.916 73.527 90.823 79.896 87.178
Regional Wages
Regional Wages 82366.710 79810.540 86792.940 82124.270 89586.450
Number of Observations 2694 1073 412 760 449
Sampling weights used.Table 4. Overall Wage Regressions Pooled by Group
(OLS Coefficients and Standard Errors)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Group
Minority/Male 5901.41 5169.78 4648.76 3499.94 2868.89 -177.73




b  -3192.85 -4232.44 -4915.76
a








(3389.47) (3185.02) (3437.81) (3036.47) (2768.08) (2976.90)
Characteristics
Annual Hours No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Personal No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Educational Background No No No Yes Yes Yes
Firm No No No No Yes Yes
Regional Wages No No No No No Yes
The number of observations are 2694. Sampling weights used.
a indicates significantly different from white/het/male at 5% level.
b indicates significantly different from minority men at 5% level.
c indicates significantly different from white/het/female at 5% level.Table 5. Description of Measured Discrimination by Group
Group
White/Het/Male Minority/Male White/Het/Female Minority/Female
  D1
Mean 0.00 -422.91 5066.88 9372.93
Percentile
25% -14031.44 -18614.42 -9985.91 -7329.34
50% 2654.05 4197.38 7464.67 9613.01
75% 19500.23 19914.29 23548.87 30540.90
99% 70519.64 67212.27 80661.42 73322.88
D2
Mean 0.00 -422.91 5066.88 9372.93
Percentile
25% 0.00 -7075.41 -5133.36 830.45
50% 0.00 -386.50 5912.33 9018.69
75% 0.00 6692.11 13938.45 18205.00
99% 0.00 41320.31 42552.38 51044.52
Number of Observations 1073 412 760 449
D1equals predicted wages for white/het/male minus actual earnings for each individual. D2 equals
predicted wages for white/het/male minus predicted wages based on group affilation for each individual.
Underlying regressions for D1 and D2 include annual hours, demographic characteristics, educational












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix Table 1. Variable Definitions
Variable Name Variable Definition
Demographic Characteristics
Age
a equal to the survey year (2002) minus the respondent’s year of birth. 
Marital Status equal to one if the respondent reported that they were married for the first time or were
remarried after previously being divorced/widowed/annulment, and zero otherwise
Presence of Children equal to one if the number of kids who live with the respondent for a significant part of the
year is one or more, and zero otherwise.
Educational Background
Law School Directly
b equal to one if the respondent went to law school directly from their undergraduate degree,
and zero otherwise  
Pass Bar 1st Try equal to one if the respondent passed their bar exam for the state in which they are currently
working on the first try, and zero otherwise (including missing values). 
Law School Ranking
c
  Top 10 equal to one if the respondent's law school ranked in the Top 10, and zero otherwise.
  Top 11-20 equal to one if the respondent's law school ranked in the Top 11-20, and zero otherwise.
  Top 21-100 equal to one if the respondent's law school ranked in the Top 21-100, and zero otherwise.
  Tier 3 & Lower equal to one if the respondent's law school ranked in Tier 3 & lower, and zero otherwise.
# of Additonal Job Offers equal to the number of additional job offers (public & private) the respondent had.
Participation in:
  Law Review equal one for those respondents who report participating in law review and zero otherwise 
  Moot Court equal one for those respondents who report participating in moot court and zero otherwise 
  Pro Bono Work equal one for those respondents who report participating in pro bono work and zero otherwise 
Leadership in Extra 
Curricular Activity
equal to one if the new lawyer played a leadership role in any extra-curricular activity, and
zero otherwise (including missing values).
Tenure
d equal to the survey date (month/year) minus the current job date (month/year) divided by 12
to convert the value into years.  Negative values were set equal to zero.
Firm Characteristics
Type of Organization
  Private Law Firm equal to one if the respondent works in a private law firm, and zero otherwise.
  Solo Practice equal to one if the respondent works in a private law firm, and zero otherwise.
  Government equal to one if the respondent works in a government organizations (i.e., Federal, State/Local,
legal services or public defender, public interest), and zero otherwise.
  Other Organization equal to one if the respondent works in other organization (i.e., professional service firm,
other fortune 1000 industry/service, other business/industry, educational, labor union trade
association, other). , and zero otherwise.
Number of Lawyers at your 
location/firm
equal to the number of lawyers at your location, however if this information is missing we 




equal to the average annual earnings of all AJD respondents in a given region (New York
City, District of Columbia, Chicago, Los Angeles, Atlanta, Houston, Minneapolis, San
Francisco, Connecticut, New Jersey, Florida, Tennessee, Oklahoma, Indiana, St. Louis, Utah,
Oregon, and Boston) before any eligible observations were dropped from the analysis.
Notes:
a. For those respondents that had missing year of birth, we calculated age as the survey year (2002) minus the year o
their undergraduate degree minus 16 (the average number of years to acquire an undergraduate degree) minus 5 (the
average number of years prior to entering kindergarten).  
b. For those respondent’s for whom this information was missing (3 observations), we assume they did not go to law
school directly. We confirmed this was a reasonable assumption by looking at the year of graduation for the
undergraduate degree and the year of graduation for the law school degree. 
c. The law school ranking is based on the U.S. News (2003) ranking of the respondent's law school.
d. The survey year was 2002; the survey months included July, March, and September. The majority of the respondents
were surveyed in March. One respondent had missing information on the month of the current job, for this individual we
simply subtracted the year of the current job from the survey year (2002). Finally, for those respondents (12 observations)
with missing information on the current job date (both month and year) we used the year they passed the bar exam (in the
first state mentioned) and subtracted that year from the survey year (2002).
e. The AJD included 815 respondents who were not eligible in Wave 1, leaving a total sample size of 4,538 observations.